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Dodd-Frank Act Progress: Stress Testing for Over $10B Asset Banks Approaches February 21, 2012
In this issue of The Institutional Risk Analyst, IRA CEO Dennis Santiago discusses observations of the latest round of Notices of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) from bank regulators for bank stress testing. Managing systemic risk -- the kind that gives rise to "Black Swans" -- is what the Dodd-Frank Act was meant to do. U.S. regulators are methodically -- albeit slowly -- marching in that direction, but the jury is still out on whether systemic risk will actually be reduced as a result of these efforts. Part of the lack of speed comes from the fact that multiple regulatory agencies have to coordinate with each other. The other part is that theory about how to actually go about doing meaningful and comparable stress testing has been somewhat of a challenge to bank regulators. The initial request for comment by regulators on the stress testing back in the summer of 2011 was a hopeless guidance statement that was little more than "everyone try to do your best" that would have resulted in excessive implementation costs and -- more important -- an inability to meaningfully compare the analysis of one bank to another. IRA was one of the few respondents to that request for comment where we advocated that regulators consider using standardized stress tests based on stressing banks with a broad battery of significant systemic shock scenarios and requiring reporting on specific measures of merit as well as explanations – including methods and assumptions -- of the risk mitigation strategies contemplated by bank management. Click Here to see our comments. To prove that it could be done we built a prototype Stress Test Edition of the IRA Bank Monitor that enabled subjecting every bank to identical stress testing. We believed – and continue to believe -- very strongly that creating a stress testing regime that mandates apples-to-apples comparability is what is needed for the United States economy to "manage" and not just endure systemic threats. Without such an implementation approach to Dodd-Frank, our banks, regulators, policy makers, markets and the general public would still be flying blind. FIL-7-2012 On February 3, 2012 the FDIC released FIL-7-2012 adding another turn in the implementation plan for the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This particular NPRM notifies FDIC-insured state nonmember banks and FDIC-insured state-chartered savings associations with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion that they -- like the bank holding companies and member banks -- are also required by Dodd-Frank to conduct annual stress tests. FIL-7-2012 contains provisions that do indeed move towards standard and comparable operational stress testing. Naturally we like the direction the testing regime design is going because it conforms to the census based approach we use in the IRA Bank Monitor that bankers, bank vendors, corporate treaurers and individual depositors buy and use every day from us on the internet. Among other things, FIL-7-2012 calls for assessing the potential impact of economic and financial stresses on the earnings, losses, and capital of a covered bank over a nine quarter planning horizon, taking into account the current condition of the bank and its risks, exposures, strategies, and activities. The proposed rule affects both FDIC member banks and covered state nonmember banks although nonmember banks will only be required to perform a capital adequacy stress test once a year. It asserts that the FDIC will develop three standardized stress scenarios each year that will change in accordance with prevailing economic conditions. The proposed rule also states that the results of the stress tests will be "public" and that the public summary is to include projections of losses, pre-provision net revenue, loss reserves, net income, and pro forma capital levels and ratios over the planning horizon under each FDIC test scenario, and that the public disclosure shall include a general description of the risks covered and stress testing methodologies used. Making Differential Shock-Response Patterns More Transparent We particularly like the public disclosure part of FIL-7-2012 a lot. As we used to say about the dubious "pillars" of the Basel process, there is no market discipline without public disclosure. The list of items to be reported says the bank regulators are focused on two things, loan losses and capital adequacy. We think the regulators should also consider enumerating a list of other operational risks that must be considered by the banks. In our discussions with bankers as we have been working on the Stress Test Edition of the IRA Bank Monitor, we have run into instances of ostrich behavior, that is, reluctance by some bankers to consider certain types of business risk. We believe they are not likely to apply rigor to their more dire – and uncomfortable – areas of risk analysis unless told to do so. We suggest regulators explore the areas of policy risk, market risk and competitive risk at the systemic shift level, not just to help management but also to support good corporate governance at the board level. Policy risks would include changes in capital ratio testing criteria and minima such as adoption of Basel III Accord standards that would add Tier1 + Tier 2 to RWA Ratio and Tangible Common Equity Ratio minimum criteria to the process. T1+T2/RWA ratios tend to affects smaller banks more abruptly and we have found that Basel III’s 4.5% TCE minima does impact some larger banks. In other words, we’ve already found that policy risk affects the various strata of the banking industry differentially. The IRA Bank Monitor was reprogrammed to begin tracking all of these capital test points in 2011 including the Basel III test points and now provides tracking reports on these figures of merit. Other policy risks include the net effect of non-performing mortgage resolution, an area where the U.S. economy continues to play the "kick the can down the road" game. We see a broad variety of coping strategies in play as banks deal with their inventories of troubled assets and winnow down their overhangs of delinquencies, non-accruals and REO’s to document their accounting rationale to release balance sheet loss reserves back to their income statements to make investor relations expectation numbers. And then there’s mother of all policy risks, ZIRP or Zero Interest Rate Policy, that sucking sound in the room draining blood from Main Street; more on this below. Market risks such as customers changing deposit and borrowing habits are very real and even tiny shifts in movement like consumers doing "Move Your Money" in the direction of community banks and credit unions can give rise to things like the doubling of uncertainty margins in core deposit volatilities, the kind of stuff that keeps chief risk officers up at night. Other market risks include strategic walk away risks on commercial lending giving rise to exposure at default and the lack of lending demand of the type that meets credit quality minima of the current risk adverse landscape. This is the kind of stuff that creates pent up supply and demand that is the mother of invention for non-bank business alternatives that may or may not, in turn, create new systemic risks to worry about. Competitive risk is something we at IRA see every day as we observe each and every active bank in the United States. One of the biggest risks banks face is the fact that market share – particularly among the bigger players – is very much a zero sum game. Strategies can and do run into problems. Take this tale from the Western provinces for instance. When Independent National Mortgage Corporation better known as Indy Mac failed, a group of financial wizards with Goldman Sachs pedigrees picked it up from the FDIC and set about building One West Federal Savings Bank. They grew the institution via additional acquisitions of weaker California banks eventually picking up First Federal of California and La Jolla, FSB amassing a goodly treasure chest of FDIC loss share agreements. One West then set about a plan to turn this strategic advantage into a major California retail bank out to take share from small, midsize and large institutions. Television ads hit the airwaves and I remember thinking at the time that most classic of Midtown Manhattan utterances, "Hmm, well that’s a gutsy move." What One West failed to note was that there was another banker who had also bought big in California. Jamie Dimon had picked up Washington Mutual and all of that bank’s branches and he was setting about – you got it – building a retail banks out to take share from small, midsize and large institutions. And Mr. Dimon was out to take chunks of zero sum game from powerhouses like Bank of America and Well Fargo. Television advertising hit the airwaves also initially emphasizing the mighty reputation of J.P. Morgan coming to subdue the Wild West. Of course that was about the time Arianna Huffington kicked off "Move Your Money" creating reputational risk for anything attempting to migrate beyond the thirteen Burroughs. The marketing campaign was rebranded to emphasize the less obtrusive Chase -- sans the Manhattan -- label. But in hard ball zero sum competition, Bank of America – which IRA’s analysis shows remains the most efficient retail bank on the planet able to hold twice the deposits per county with half the number of branches versus any peer – and Wells Fargo – a bank that sometimes claims to be the biggest community bank on the brick and mortar scene with a vast number of physical locations – simply were not about to let new entrants take customer base away from them. They set about revamping their own business practices to thwart the carpet baggers from the East. The saga continues. This story is repeated in differing scales in pretty much any other geographic region or asset group strata one cares to look at. In a ZIRP capped economy, it’s a dog eat dog business environment with banks trying to take share of other banks. Plans have a way of not working out quite as planned. We have yet to see this type of beggar they neighbor competition treated as a measured risk parameter in bank regulation analysis. We believe that it is in the interest of systemic risk management to be asking banks to consider these explicit sources of risk when reporting on their operations. Painful as it is to some, transparency that reveals they have their heads in the sand will actually help them and the economy in the long run. In the military, they call that "training up". Observing Some Numbers We asked the IRA Bank Monitor to pull up which FDIC certificate holders will be affected by FIL-7-2012, when approved and it gave us back a list of one hundred and nine (109) institutions based on our September 2011. Of these banks, nineteen (19) are super large over $100B asset institutions. The other ninety (90) had reported assets between $10B and $100B as of September 30, 2011. We also asked the IRA Bank Monitor to summarize information on institutions in the $1B to $10B range and those under $1B assets for comparison purposes just because our machinery can test these institutions just as easily, something that we thing the community banks with assets below $10B would be wise to do. How Many Institutions Are Affected by the Current Dodd-Frank Act Rule Making?
Notice that regulators are focusing their efforts on just a few institutions representing the greatest asset and deposit mass – but not necessarily the greatest presence on Main Street -- in the overall population of U.S. banks. The vast majority of the bank industry participants are below the radar. That deposits number includes about a $2 trillion accumulation of deposits at the over $100B’s since the beginning of the financial crisis as corporation’s lost faith in the U.S. economic engine and parked their money. The money went to these banks because private deposit insurance typically requires the bank have a safety rating. At the time the only ratings available were from the NRSRO’s. This is no longer the case due to the emergence of safety and soundness ratings by firms like IRA and others that have broader coverage than the NRSRO’s. We regularly hear from community banks that they think ratings like ours are far more appropriate for monitoring deposit insurance as well as letters of credit because the safety and soundness analytics approach is closer how regulators examine them. As insurance company actuaries begin to learn to use these benchmarks – they do back test very nicely --, the smaller banks may be poised to argue for a far more substantial corporate version of the 2010 consumer "Move Your Money" migration phenomenon at some point. It’s a defensive business challenge that the Large Complex Institutions (LCI’s) will have to face at some point. We think this is good for a better and more vibrant economy in the long turn and we have confidence that all of these savvy and competitive businesses are up to the challenge. The reason for this will boil down to the market pressure of corporate self-interest and the need to get Main Street moving again. Take a look at the asset allocations by asset strata, Asset Allocation Breakdown as of 3Q2011
First notice the biggest banks lend less as a percentage of their asset allocation than smaller institutions. Also notice that the really big banks are running trading desks significantly larger than their smaller counterparts who only allocate a minor portion of their assets to this aspect of financing. Most important, look at Other Assets, these include the back and forth financing money that goes between banks and the government. Try thinking of it as a related party transaction driven by zero interest rates – ZIRP again -- that funds the government instead of the Main Street economy. At about a trillion dollars, the money seeking safety via government exposures on the books of the banks is not an insignificant amount. It does directly offset what’s available to the U.S. loan base. One astute commenter to IRA recently observed that we’ve turned the banking system in to a government hedge fund by around that amount. Ultimately, it’s probably a neither here nor there thing for the banks. They’ll allocate assets to wherever conditions present opportunity. What it really says is that the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. government have a "firm specific risk" to contend with when the day comes this systemic hedge fund is closed. What are we doing? IRA is committed to continuing to improve the Stress Test Edition of the IRA Bank Monitor so that systemic maneuvering capability is available not just to the over $10B banks but to the far larger number of smaller institutions. Just the $1B to $10B population outnumbers the big houses 5-to-1 and we hear from this group all the time as they ask themselves questions about doing M&A to get bigger. And when one goes small, you start to deal with stress testing not just the smallest banks but the credit unions as well. For first pass assessment and monitoring, the computers don’t really care how big or small you are as long as you file a complete Call Report, Y9C, or Form 5300. For privileged testing on proprietary data to set up sensitivity and uncertainty measures, it actually works better for all these smaller ones to use standardized methods to cut down on the cost and risk of using theorists at each firm. It’s actually duck soup data analysis compared to analyzing and cleaning up over 10 million records of internet search engine traffic records. The bottom line is that the cat’s already out of the bag on all of this and the tidal forces are already in motion. The real question is whether regulators and industry will be smart enough to get ahead of the curve this time. The last time I made such a bold statement about systemic threats and opportunities was in 2007 when IRA’s analytics were clearly pointing at an impending debacle in the financial soundness of the banking system. I’d show the data to CRO’s and they’d have nervous breakdowns right there in front of me in the meeting rooms. I was told "If your numbers are right it means these banks are insolvent and we’d have to bail them out to keep them alive. But it has not happened yet. So will you change your numbers?’ I said "No. I think these numbers are right." And that was the end of that conversation until eventually nature took its’ course. I believe these harbinger indicators hiding in the margins are right again. There’s a tremendous opportunity for the United States if we take advantage of it that could turn the remainder of the decade from one of painfully coping to one of pioneering anew. Questions? Comments? info@institutionalriskanalytics.com
These are the 109 FDIC certificate holders will be affected by the Over $10B Asset regulations of the Dodd-Frank Act. Multiple affected unit operating entities of larger bank holding companies may appear in this detailed level list.
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